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Anyone on the Internet Can Ring Your Doorbell

4 days ago
  • #Smart Doorbell Vulnerabilities
  • #IoT Security
  • #Responsible Disclosure
  • A smart doorbell purchased from Temu, the 'Smart Doorbell X3', was found to have severe security vulnerabilities allowing unauthorized access and control.
  • An attacker can silently steal any of these doorbells from the owner's account with just two signed POST requests, making the device disappear from the original owner's app without any indication.
  • The device's persistent relay password can be obtained with a single signed request containing the device ID, enabling attackers to impersonate the doorbell during live calls with custom video and audio.
  • Wi-Fi credentials, including SSID, PSK, and session keys, are leaked via the UART debug console during boot, which is accessible with physical access using only a screwdriver.
  • The device IDs are sequential and predictable (format: 1e2023XXXXXX), making the entire fleet enumerable and susceptible to automated attacks.
  • The alert system allows anyone on the internet to ring an owner's phone with a custom image via a forged signed request, as there is no authentication beyond a weak signature.
  • Call setup and media streams are unencrypted, exposing credentials and live video/audio to anyone on the network path.
  • The firmware uses a hardcoded, static 'secret' for request signatures, identical across all devices, allowing easy forging of valid requests.
  • Over-the-air (OTA) updates are broken due to a missing download partition, meaning devices in the field cannot receive security fixes.
  • The vendor, Naxclow (Guangzhou Qiangui IoT Technology Co., Ltd.), was contacted but did not respond, leading to public disclosure after one week.