Fixing web browser history leaks
a year ago
- #security
- #web-browsing
- #privacy
- Web browsing history allows styling visited links differently, aiding navigation but posing privacy risks.
- CSS:visited pseudo-class enables styling differences, exploited via side-channel attacks to detect visited links.
- Various sophisticated side-channel techniques emerged, including DOM inspection, timing attacks, and pixel color attacks.
- Browsing habits can reveal sensitive information, enabling targeted profiling, cross-site tracking, and enhanced fingerprinting.
- Research shows browsing histories are unique and stable, with up to 97-99% uniquely identifying individuals.
- 2010 mitigations (lying about unvisited styles and restricting CSS) were complex and inadequate.
- A new solution proposes partitioning visited link history using a triple-key partition (Link URL, Top-Level Site, Frame Origin).
- This approach ensures isolation, conforms to privacy principles, and mitigates cross-site history leaks.
- Implemented in Chrome v132 (behind a flag), this solution aims to resolve privacy issues by 2025.