The theory that dating apps intentionally avoid matching people to keep them paying is not unique; it reflects a general incentive to make products worse for profit.
Similar patterns exist across industries, such as pizza restaurants using cheap ingredients, automakers cutting safety costs, and manufacturers reducing product durability.
Products are often bad because consumers prefer cheaper options, not just because producers are greedy; this is a normal market function.
Information asymmetries allow bad products to persist when consumers cannot easily judge quality, like in longevity advice or food safety.
Bad taste among consumers can lead to poor-quality products, though this is subjective and overlaps with information issues.
Pricing power from moats (e.g., brand, patents) lets companies degrade products or raise prices without competition, as seen in venues with expensive food.
The key question is why dating apps can get away with poor matching, likely due to lack of viable competition or consumer demand for alternatives.