Apple issues new challenge against UK order for access to private user data

7 hours ago

Apple has filed a new legal complaint against the UK government, challenging a Home Office demand for backdoor access to encrypted user data.
The dispute centers on Apple's Advanced Data Protection, which uses end-to-end encryption that even Apple cannot access, and has been ongoing since early 2025.
The UK government argues that law enforcement must be able to access communications to protect against terrorism and serious crime, while Apple insists it has never built a backdoor and never will.
The government's requests are made under the Investigatory Powers Act, which allows secret technical capability notices to force companies to provide access to customer data.
An earlier notice was withdrawn after backlash from US politicians, but a new request was issued in October that excludes US users.
Privacy groups such as Privacy International and Liberty have welcomed Apple's challenge, calling it crucial for protecting privacy and security.
Sir Brian Leveson, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, has defended the process, stating that notices require independent review and approval.

EU Prüm II regulation allows facial image exchange across police forces, raising mass surveillance concerns.
eIDAS 2.0 mandates European digital identity wallets by 2026 and forces browsers to trust state certificates.
High-Level Group proposes 'lawful access by design' for police access to data, criticized as mass surveillance.

Backdoored encryption has historically failed, exemplified by the weakened GSM encryption from the Cold War era still being vulnerable today.
Forcing encryption backdoors creates risks and inequalities, as some entities may get exceptions while others do not.
Total privacy without exceptions is not viable for a just society; a balance must be struck between law enforcement needs and privacy rights.

The Dutch secret services are getting a new law that makes it easier to intercept and hack on a large scale, which they claim is essentially a privacy law.
The law allows all internet and telephone cables to be monitored and data stored for a year, with provisions for sharing with foreign entities.
In 2017, a previous version of the law led to societal uproar and a referendum against it, but it was revised and now passes with little opposition.

Under Trump, the US has shifted to technofascism, using modern technologies for domestic repression, targeting immigrants, journalists, and activists.
Mercenary spyware like Pegasus and Graphite is now embraced by US agencies, with companies like Paragon and NSO Group being acquired to bypass restrictions.
Defenses against spyware include always installing updates, enabling Lockdown Mode on iOS/macOS, using Advanced Data Protection, and considering hardware with Memory Integrity Enforcement.

Global surveillance is increasing through multiple independent proposals that collectively create a comprehensive system, despite lacking a central plan.
Governments are establishing identity layers via SIM card KYC, app store age verification, OS-level age attestation, developer verification, and foreign service KYC to make devices identifiable extensions of individuals.
Governments are pushing for communications layer surveillance through client-side scanning of encrypted messages, CA mandates, TLS interception, network-level filtering, and VPN restrictions, though some efforts have been resisted.

EU Prüm II regulation allows facial image exchange across police forces, raising mass surveillance concerns.
eIDAS 2.0 mandates European digital identity wallets by 2026 and forces browsers to trust state certificates.
High-Level Group proposes 'lawful access by design' for police access to data, criticized as mass surveillance.

Backdoored encryption has historically failed, exemplified by the weakened GSM encryption from the Cold War era still being vulnerable today.
Forcing encryption backdoors creates risks and inequalities, as some entities may get exceptions while others do not.
Total privacy without exceptions is not viable for a just society; a balance must be struck between law enforcement needs and privacy rights.

The Dutch secret services are getting a new law that makes it easier to intercept and hack on a large scale, which they claim is essentially a privacy law.
The law allows all internet and telephone cables to be monitored and data stored for a year, with provisions for sharing with foreign entities.
In 2017, a previous version of the law led to societal uproar and a referendum against it, but it was revised and now passes with little opposition.

Under Trump, the US has shifted to technofascism, using modern technologies for domestic repression, targeting immigrants, journalists, and activists.
Mercenary spyware like Pegasus and Graphite is now embraced by US agencies, with companies like Paragon and NSO Group being acquired to bypass restrictions.
Defenses against spyware include always installing updates, enabling Lockdown Mode on iOS/macOS, using Advanced Data Protection, and considering hardware with Memory Integrity Enforcement.

Global surveillance is increasing through multiple independent proposals that collectively create a comprehensive system, despite lacking a central plan.
Governments are establishing identity layers via SIM card KYC, app store age verification, OS-level age attestation, developer verification, and foreign service KYC to make devices identifiable extensions of individuals.
Governments are pushing for communications layer surveillance through client-side scanning of encrypted messages, CA mandates, TLS interception, network-level filtering, and VPN restrictions, though some efforts have been resisted.

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