EU Age Verification Project Mandates Hardware-Bound Attestation

3 hours ago

The EU's open-source age-verification project mandates hardware-bound attestation, raising concerns about compatibility with Linux, custom Android ROMs, and independently compiled apps.
A project maintainer confirmed that hardware-bound attestation is an architectural requirement, not an optional implementation detail, inviting alternative proposals.
The system aims to prove age without revealing identity, relying on protected hardware like Android TEE or Apple Secure Enclave to prevent credential misuse.
Critics argue the approach limits system openness by depending on approved devices, OS versions, and attestation providers.
Hardware-backed key storage doesn't require server-side approval of the entire device, but ambiguity remains over deployment restrictiveness.
Governance restricts credential issuance to apps on an EU-maintained compliant list, preventing community-built versions from using the real service.
Linux users can access via QR code but lack native wallet support; alternative mobile OS may face trust condition challenges.
The controversy highlights whether an EU-funded open-source identity system can remain open given reliance on approved apps, hardware, and policies.

EU digital identity wallets rely on Google Play Integrity API and Apple's Managed Device Attestation, creating dependence on private companies.
Google Play Integrity API reinforces Google's ecosystem control, excludes unlicensed Android versions, and violates the Digital Market Act (DMA).
Hardware Attestation API is an open alternative but ignored, while government adoption of Play Integrity contradicts digital sovereignty goals.

Google's Android Developer Verifier (ADV) process acts as a virus installed on Android 8+ devices, awaiting remote activation.
ADV runs as a system service with root privileges, cannot be blocked or removed, and is spread via Play Protect.
Once activated, ADV blocks software from developers not approved by Google, threatening F-Droid and open-source repositories.

The W3C is developing end-to-end encryption (E2EE) for ActivityPub, separate from a key transparency proposal for the Fediverse.
Three main goals are outlined: enabling E2EE messaging (Fundamental), ensuring correct encryption (Security), and verifiably authenticating user keys without central authority (Authenticity).
Key transparency provides a decentralized root of trust by logging which ActivityPub actor controls which signing keys, addressing authenticity.

Sideloading restrictions control software, not hardware, despite claims of hardware ownership.
The real issue is the inability to install alternative operating systems on owned hardware, not app restrictions.
Apple's tight hardware-software integration is a case study; forcing changes would undermine iOS's success.

Confidential computing relies on remote attestation to prove a server runs in a genuine Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) before sharing sensitive data.
New research reveals flaws in attested TLS protocols used in confidential computing, allowing relay attacks where a client’s connection can be redirected to a compromised server without detection.
The study formalizes three levels of cryptographic binding for attestation, with level three (tying evidence to application traffic keys) potentially unattainable in current intra-handshake architectures.

EU digital identity wallets rely on Google Play Integrity API and Apple's Managed Device Attestation, creating dependence on private companies.
Google Play Integrity API reinforces Google's ecosystem control, excludes unlicensed Android versions, and violates the Digital Market Act (DMA).
Hardware Attestation API is an open alternative but ignored, while government adoption of Play Integrity contradicts digital sovereignty goals.

Google's Android Developer Verifier (ADV) process acts as a virus installed on Android 8+ devices, awaiting remote activation.
ADV runs as a system service with root privileges, cannot be blocked or removed, and is spread via Play Protect.
Once activated, ADV blocks software from developers not approved by Google, threatening F-Droid and open-source repositories.

The W3C is developing end-to-end encryption (E2EE) for ActivityPub, separate from a key transparency proposal for the Fediverse.
Three main goals are outlined: enabling E2EE messaging (Fundamental), ensuring correct encryption (Security), and verifiably authenticating user keys without central authority (Authenticity).
Key transparency provides a decentralized root of trust by logging which ActivityPub actor controls which signing keys, addressing authenticity.

Sideloading restrictions control software, not hardware, despite claims of hardware ownership.
The real issue is the inability to install alternative operating systems on owned hardware, not app restrictions.
Apple's tight hardware-software integration is a case study; forcing changes would undermine iOS's success.

Confidential computing relies on remote attestation to prove a server runs in a genuine Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) before sharing sensitive data.
New research reveals flaws in attested TLS protocols used in confidential computing, allowing relay attacks where a client’s connection can be redirected to a compromised server without detection.
The study formalizes three levels of cryptographic binding for attestation, with level three (tying evidence to application traffic keys) potentially unattainable in current intra-handshake architectures.

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