GNSS Jamming and Spoofing, aka Galileo's Authentication Algorithm Part 3 - Bert Hubert's writings
a day ago
- GNSS jamming is a denial-of-service attack that stops positioning, but spoofing is more dangerous as it can deceive receivers into believing false locations.
- Spoofing detection is critical; turning spoofing into jamming makes it easier to handle, while undetected spoofing can lead to catastrophic outcomes.
- Meaconing involves recording and replaying authentic GNSS signals from one location to another, making it hard to detect without additional checks like precise clocks or multiple receivers.
- Receivers can use multiple techniques to detect spoofing, including monitoring signal strength, cross-checking satellite data from multiple constellations, and using RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring).
- OSNMA adds digital signatures to navigation messages to authenticate content, but it cannot fully protect against timing-based attacks or meaconing without precise time references.
- Advanced spoofing attacks may require multiple transmitters to mimic satellite parallax, raising the bar significantly for attackers.
- Receiver manufacturers often do not implement robust spoofing detection features, leaving commodity devices vulnerable to simple attacks.
- OSNMA is a valuable tool but not a complete solution; it works best alongside physical and software-based detection methods to raise the difficulty of successful attacks.