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Shipping post-quantum cryptography to Python – The Trail of Bits Blog
a day ago
- pyca/cryptography version 48 now supports post-quantum algorithms ML-KEM and ML-DSA, funded by the Sovereign Tech Agency.
- Post-quantum cryptography addresses threats from quantum computers, with U.S. government migration deadlines set for 2030-2031.
- ML-DSA signatures and ML-KEM key exchange have larger data sizes than classical algorithms (e.g., Ed25519, X25519).
- SLH-DSA, a hash-based signature standard, is not yet supported but is under development for future updates.
- Protocol integration and application adoption are needed for a complete migration to post-quantum cryptography in Python.
Show HN: Grade your code's post-quantum crypto exposure A–F, free, in-browser
a day ago
- A Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) is crucial for identifying quantum-vulnerable cryptography in your stack as part of PQC migration.
- An open-source scanner provides a full scan in CI/CD workflows, generating a CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM, SARIF report, and an A–F grade badge without uploading data.
- The scan can be run locally via npm or integrated into GitHub Actions, with options to fail builds on broken classical cryptography.
- For audit readiness, an Evidence Pack Express offers a cryptographically signed deliverable including an executive summary, findings, CBOM, and migration plan.
- Note: The scanner is lexical, findings are leads to verify, not a complete inventory, and it does not guarantee quantum safety or certification.
Bugs happen: The easy way to compare solo PQ to ECC+PQ
19 hours ago
- ECC+PQ (hybrid) is recommended over solo PQ because solo PQ will lead to many exploitable software vulnerabilities, causing immediate security disasters.
- ML-KEM and ML-DSA implementations have already had numerous bugs and timing leaks (e.g., KyberSlash1, KyberSlash2), and more vulnerabilities are expected as they are newer and less tested than ECC software.
- Even if PQ specifications remain unbroken, software flaws in PQ libraries will expose keys, whereas an ECC layer can rescue users by delaying attacks and limiting damage.
- Quantum attacks will be expensive and limited in scale initially, so ECC provides additional protection by delaying attacks until quantum computers are available and affordable.
- The cost of adding ECC to PQ is negligible compared to PQ's own costs (e.g., X25519 adds only 32 bytes to ML-KEM's 800+ bytes), and deployment examples (like Cloudflare) show ECC+PQ is already working without delays.
- Proponents of solo PQ use flawed arguments, such as overstating complexity or costs, and ignore the value of ECC in mitigating software vulnerabilities and delaying quantum attacks.

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#post-quantum cryptography

Shipping post-quantum cryptography to Python – The Trail of Bits Blog

Show HN: Grade your code's post-quantum crypto exposure A–F, free, in-browser

Bugs happen: The easy way to compare solo PQ to ECC+PQ